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In the history of American local government, there has been con-
tinuous tension between local and state law-making bodies.1 Con-
ventional theory regards municipalities as mere creatures of state
governments, without inherent powers of their own. Logically, con-
flict should not exist between a creature and its parent. The long-
standing struggle between cities and state legislatures, however,
suggests that the creature theory of local government does not always
square with the perceptions of the actors in the battle.
The conflict between municipalities and states involves subtle
blends of the state legislative and constitutional provisions by which
state and local government powers are expanded or restricted. State
statutes represent one primary source of municipal power. Statutes
can be drafted and interpreted narrowly or broadly. The rule of stat-
utory construction known as the Dillon Rule, for example, provides
that courts strictly construe grants of municipal power, recognizing
no power unless expressly granted by the state legislature or unless it
must exist by reason of necessary implication from powers expresssly
* Professor of Law, University of Washington, School of Law; B.S., University of
Denver, 1954; LL.B., University of Denver, 1956; LL.M., Yale Law School, 1958.
I. A. SYED, POLITICAL THEORY OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1966).
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granted.2
Another source of municipal power is the state constitution. A
constitutional grant can be in relatively specific terms or generic. As
with statutes, judicial interpretation of constitutional grants may be
strict or generous.
The phrase "home rule" describes a third type of municipal
power.3 The term covers a variety of constitutional and statutory ap-
proaches to conferring broad powers upon local governments. In ad-
dition, home rule grants can have a second important function.
When plenary authority is granted to a municipality by constitutional
grant through home rule, the possibility exists that in addition to
granting power to the municipality, the constitutional provision may
also be treated as limiting the power of the state legislature. Constitu-
tional home rule provisions sometimes expressly provide for this limit
on state power.4 Other times the result is achieved through judicial
interpretation.' In some states, such as Washington, the limit does
not exist in any form.6
Clear analysis of state and local conflict requires that the legal
functions of home rule be kept distinct. Borrowing some labels from
Hohfeld,7 it is possible to say that a constitutional home rule grant
may confer apower on the municipality which permits the munici-
pality to act in the described area without further legislative grants.
This function of home rule represents a significant advance over the
conventional Dillon's Rule approach to conferring local municipal
competency. The home rule grant permits cities to respond to
problems promptly, without the delay, uncertaintly and sometimes
inappropriate opposition which characterize a system requiring ex-
plicit state legislative authority for each municipal action.'
2. The rule, pervasive in all local government law cases, is stated in J. DILLON,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 448-55 (5th ed. 1911).
3. See MCGOLDRICK, LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE (1933);
Sandalow, The Limits of Municioal Power Under Home Rule.- 4 Rolefor the Courts,
48 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1964).
4. See, e.g., the Colorado constitution quoted in the text at note 64 infra.
5. F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAS 350 (1970).
6. Trautman, Legislative Control of Municipal Corporations in Washington, 38
WASH. L. REV. 743 (1963).
7. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reason-
ing, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
8. Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule.- 4 Role For the




The role of a home rule grant operating as a limit on the state
legislature is quite different. In the states where home rule has this
effect, the home rule grant can be viewed as having conferred on mu-
nicipalities what Hohfeld would have called an immunity from state
interference. The result of this immunity is to permit the city to act in
the face of an inconsistent state statute. It is critical to note that a
home rule immunity can be expanded or contracted without necessar-
ily affecting the breadth of the home rule grant considered as a
power.
Despite the importance of distinguishing the two functions of the
home rule grant, there is ample evidence in judicial opinions that this
separation has not occurred. Instead, court discussions slip from one
meaning to the other with a consequent loss of analytic clarity. In
this Article, an effort will be made to keep the home rule functions
separate and to use the word "power" to refer to the grant of an abil-
ity of the local government to act, and the word "immunity" to refer
to the area of freedom from state interference which the constitu-
tional grant may also have conferred.
A final introductory observation: the literature of state and local
governmental law is highly localized, reflecting a conscious assess-
ment that local variations in constitutional and statutory provisions-
as well as differences in judicial attitudes-limit the utility of articu-
lating general legal principles. Although there are a few impressive
exceptions to this phenomenon,9 this tendency is pervasive. Never-
theless, there is no reason to suppose that local variations in this field
are significantly different from those in other areas of the law, or that
the benefits of a search for general principles are less substantial. In-
deed, in most judicial resolutions of state-local conflict, the relevant
statutory and constitutional provisions are so general that there is
usually significant room for the exercise of judicial discretion and
judgment. Hence, comparative analysis may be of value in the search
for underlying principles.
II. THREE CURRENT DECISIONS
Three recent state supreme court decisions provide an opportunity
to examine current judicial attitudes toward this complex of legal is-
sues." In Weekes v. City of Oakland,'1 the Supreme Court of Cali-
9, Id.
10. The three cases to be discussed are: Weekes v. City of Oakland, 21 Cal. 3d
386. 579 P.2d 449, 146 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1978); City of La Grande Public Employees
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fornia faced the issue of whether a city could impose an "employee
license fee." The California Constitution authorizes a home rule city
to
make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect to
municipal affairs, subject only to restrictions and limitations pro-
vided in their several charters and in respect to other matters
they shall be subject to general laws. City charters adopted pur-
suant to this constitution shall. . . with respect to municipal af-
fairs . . . supersede all laws inconsistent therewith."1
To the extent this provision serves as a grant of power to impose the
tax in question, a majority of the court was persuaded that this provi-
sion was adequate, citing a number of cases holding the power to
impose taxes for revenue purposes, including license taxes, within the
power of municipal corporations. 3 Two dissenting judges observed
that all the modern cases cited for the proposition were decided in the
absence of a conflicting or prohibitory state statute and therefore did
not represent authority for municipal imposition of such a tax in the
face of a conflicting state enactment. Had they been using the termi-
nology employed here, the dissenting judges could have said that the
California Constitution conferred a power to enact a tax but con-
ferred no immunity from state interference with the exercise of the
power.
The action of the state legislature was ambiguous. Pursuant to a
constitutional grant,1 4 the state had enacted its own personal income
tax. One of the provisions of that Act expressed a clear intent to pre-
empt at least some part of the "field" of income taxes. Section
17041.5 of the California Code prohibits a city from levying "a tax
upon the income. . . of any person." On the other hand, the provi-
sion expressly permits a municipal "license tax upon a business mea-
sured by or according to gross receipts."' 5
The Oakland ordinance, 6 adopted in 1974, provided that as of
July 1976 a license fee would be imposed for the privilege of engag-
Retirement Bd., 281 Or. 137, 576 P.2d 1204, af'd on rehearing, 284 Or. 173, 586 P.2d
765 (1978); Thornton v. Farmers' Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 575 P.2d 382 (Colo.
1978).
11. 21 Cal. 3d 386, 579 P.2d 449, 146 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1978).
12. CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 5.
13. 21 Cal. 3d at 393, 579 P.2d at 452, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 561.
14. CAL. CONsT. art. 13.
15. CAL. REV. & TAx CODE § 17041.5 (Deering 1975).




ing in any business, trade or occupation, the fee to be measured by
one percent of the gross receipts in excess of $1,625 for each quarterly
period. The ordinance covered any business, trade, occupation or
profession and, with the exception of domestic servants employed in
private homes, it seemed to reach each kind of calling, whether or not
carried on for profit and including offices and positions filled by elec-
tion or by appointment. The term "gross receipts" included the total
amount of all salaries, wages, commissions, bonuses, or other money
payments of any kind or any other considerations having monetary
value which a person receives or becomes entitled to receive for any
work done or services rendered. Employers were required to with-
hold employee license fees and both the employer and the employee
filed regular returns.
The trial court held that the state had effectively prohibited the
municipal measure and therefore declared it invalid. The court of
appeals upheld the measure, reasoning that the statute quoted did not
preclude the particular sort of measure Oakland had enacted, which
was said to have some of the characteristics of both a permitted occu-
pational license tax and a prohibited personal income tax.17 The
California Supreme Court agreed. The majority characterized the
measure as an occupational tax which the Code expressly permitted,
thus finding no conflict between the ordinance and the statute. With
this characterization, there was no need for the court to consider
whether the constitution conferred any immunity on cities from state
prohibitions of local income taxes. The state simply did not prohibit
what the municipality had enacted.
Justice Richardson, in a concurring opinion, urged that the under-
lying constitutional immunity ought to be clarified to provide gui-
dance to the cities and the legislature and to forestall further
litigation. He believed that the home rule amendment conferred an
immunity on California cities such that "the legislature lacks power
to proscribe municipal income taxes." 8
Justice Richardson first disposed of the argument that the constitu-
tional grant of authority to the state legislature to enact an income tax
should be regarded as an exclusive grant depriving cities of any simi-
lar power. After examining the legislative history, the jurist con-
opinion at 64 Cal. App. 3d 907, - (case omitted from reporter), 134 Cal. Rptr. 858,
861-63 (1976).
17. 64 Cal. App. 3d 907, 134 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1976).
18. 21 Cal. 3d at 399, 579 P.2d at 456, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 565.
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cluded that when the home rule amendment was adopted seventeen
years after the constitutional provision in question, it conferred upon
the municipalities an independent power of taxation concurrent with,
but not dependent upon, any legislative grant.
Secondly, Justice Richardson examined the question of whether
the state pre-empted the municipal income tax, or whether, phrased
slightly differently, the income tax question had become something
other than a "municipal affair"-that category of matters which the
constitution protects from state legislative interference.
Justice Richardson did not doubt the vagueness of the "municipal
affairs" concept. Nevertheless, he regarded it as the duty of the
court19 to "weigh, in each case, the city's interest against the state's
need to require uniformity, or to prohibit, control or coordinate the
extraterritorial impact of the challenged municipal activity."2 More-
over, giving full weight to the values reflected in the home rule
amendment required that state pre-emption be limited to its least re-
strictive form.
Applying this standard to the tax in the case, Justice Richardson
concluded that the legitimate state interests in preventing "a network
of municipal income taxes that vary in their structure and compre-
hensiveness from city to city"'" could be met by state action short of
flat prohibition of municipal income taxes. For example, the matter
of interjurisdictional conflicts could be resolved as it was with the
local sales tax by a mandatory credit and allocation system. Or the
state could design a model municipal income tax with a standard rate
and exemptions which could be adopted at the option of the munici-
pality. The Richardson view, then, posits that the state lacked power
to prohibit such a tax, though it could impose some regulation on the
form of such taxes in the interest of statewide uniformity and nondis-
crimination.
Two dissenting justices also faced the question of the state's power
to proscribe municipal income taxes. They urged that the city's "fee"
was obviously an income tax and the state had just as obviously pro-
hibited it. Justice Mosk was concerned that the majority and concur-
ring opinions gave a green light to all the tax-hungry municipalities
in the state by implying that they could avoid the strictures of the
income tax prohibition by adopting an income tax in this disguised
19. Id. at 405, 579 P.2d at 459, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 568.





form.22 Justice Thompson, in a long dissent tracing the history of
municipal income taxes in California, believed that the Richardson
balancing test was inapt. In his view, the question was simply
whether a statewide concern was present. If so, there is no authority
for balancing the state's interest against that of the city; the state sim-
ply must prevail.
The California result, as illustrated by Weekes, is one in which the
role of the courts will be significant. If the view of the concurring
justice prevails in subsequent cases where the conflict issue cannot be
finessed, as it was by the majority here, the courts must attempt to
balance the interest of the state with that of the municipality. The
mere expression of the state in an explicitly prohibitory statute, for
example, will not preclude a judicial finding that the subject of the
statute is nevertheless a "municipal affair" beyond the power of the
state to affect.
On what grounds should such a balance be struck? The Richard-
son opinion reviewed the content given the term "municipal affair"
by the California courts and found that matters which are regulatory
are less likely to be within the protected area of municipal affairs. On
the other hand, courts have regularly held matters of taxation for rev-
enue purposes to be municipal affairs.23 The Richardson analysis
makes clear that the categories are not fixed: "Matters once entirely
local in nature may, in a society rapidly increasing in both complex-
ity and interdependence, lose their 'strictly local' character and be-
come 'matters of statewide concern.' ,24
Further, the Richardson opinion indicated something of the
weights to be assigned in the process of balancing. It is not enough
that some state interest is present; even in this case, Richardson con-
ceded, the state has an interest that was not "wholly fictitious. ' 25 The
"wholly fictitious" standard, however, is insufficient; it would trivial-
ize the idea of a local government immunity. Under the Richardson
view, the interest of the state must reach some unstated level of sub-
stantiality. The character of the state interest is also limited; that is,
not every sort of state concern for the matter under scrutiny will be
put into the balance. The interests that will be given significant
weight are essentially interests in statewide uniformity and in mini-
22. See 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 259 (1979) (Oakland has repealed the "fee").
23 21 Cal. 3d at 406, 579 P.2d at 460, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
24. Id.
25. 1d. at 407, 579 P.2d at 461, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
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mizing the extraterritorial impact of the challenged municipal activ-
ity.2
6
In applying these standards to the tax in question, Richardson
found that the legitimate state interests could be protected without
resort to outright prohibition. This suggests, as well, that the state
interests given weight in the balancing process will be only those in-
terests which cannot be protected by less restrictive means.
The California court battles over the meaning of the municipal af-
fairs immunity suggest the need for a clarifying principle. Professor
Sato, who has closely analyzed the cases, proposes that the reach of
the municipal affairs immunity be determined by reference to three
standards.27 First, an otherwise authorized (and constitutional) mu-
nicipal act should be protected by a municipal affairs immunity if it
generates no significant external impacts on those not represented by
the acting government. Second, absent the sort of external effects
mentioned above, a municipal act would prevail over a conflicting
state act applicable only to the public sector. The principle is that
when a state policy is so pervasive that it has been applied by the
state to both private and public sectors (e.g, workmen's compensa-
tion), local governments should not be able to thwart the policy by
promulgating a different rule. On the other hand, when the state pol-
icy is less pervasive and applies only to the public sector (e.g., salaries
and pensions of public officers), local preferences should be allowed
to prevail. Third, a municipal act should be protected by a municipal
affairs immunity when it is a matter of structure or process designed
to insure that the local government is efficient, responsive and re-
sponsible. Sato argues that such questions-dealing with how and by
whom corporate powers shall be exercised-generally will not have
external effects. He recognizes, though, that some matters which ap-
pear structural, such as municipal tort claims procedures, are so inte-
grally a part of a state policy (e.g., prompt payment of claims against
the government) that they require some state control.28
Professor Sato observes29 that this approach does not eliminate ju-
dicial intervention; judgments will remain in the process of identify-
ing and weighing the substantiality of externalities, assessing the
26. Id.
27. Sato, "Municipal .4ffairs" in California, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1075-78
(1972).
28. Id. at 1084.




degree of pervasiveness of various state policies and the like. But he
believes that such an approach will be more focused and presumably
more predictable. His review of the California cases shows that
many of them can be fitted, at least roughly, into this analysis.30 Sato
concedes the analysis may be overly ambitious, that the "difficulties
inherent in the problem may defy reduction in this fashion."'"
A central concern with the doctrine under consideration is whether
the courts are the best instrumentalities to make judgments about the
appropriate reach of local government powers.3 2 Even if one agrees
with Professor Sato on the occasions when municipal activities ought
to be immunized from state interference, there remains the question
whether the difficult characterizations required in his analysis are ap-
propriately made by the courts. A 1978 ruling by the Oregon
Supreme Court in City of La Grande v. Public Employees Retirement
Board33 squarely confronted the question about the appropriate ju-
dicial role in this area.
Home rule in Oregon, as in California, is constitutionally rooted.
Each of the components of the device-the grant of power to cities
and the immunity from state interference-is provided for separately.
The grant of power occurs in article XI, section 2: "the legal voters of
every city and town are hereby granted power to enact and amend
their municipal charter, subject to the constitution and criminal laws
of the State of Oregon."34 Additionally, article IV, section 1(5), "fur-
ther reserved to the qualified voters of each municipality and dis-
trict," the initiative and referendum powers "as to all local, special
and municipal legislation of every character in or for their municipal-
ity or district.""
The immunity conferred on Oregon local governments appears in
article XI, section 2: "the legislative assembly shall not enact, amend
or repeal any charter or act of incorporation for any municipality,
city or town."3 6 The reach of the immunity, prior to the instant case,
30, Id. at 1078-1105.
31. Id. at 1109.
32. See Sandalow, supra note 6; Sato, supra note 24 for the two most thorough
examinations of this aspect of the problem.
33. 281 Or. 137, 576 P.2d 1204, a#d on rehearing, 284 Or. 173, 586 P.2d 765
(1978)
34. OR. CONST. art. 11, § 2.
35. OR. CONST. art. 4, § 1(5).
36. OR. CONST. art. 11, § 2.
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was best described in Heinig v. Milwaukee,3 7 which declared uncon-
stitutional a state law requiring a city to establish a civil service sys-
tem. The court held that the state did not have power under article
XI, section 2 to so intrude in local matters. The court stated:
the legislative assembly does not have the authority to enact a
law relating to city government even though it is of general ap-
plicability to all cities in the state unless the subject matter of the
enactment is of general concern to the state as a whole, that is to
say that it is a matter of more than local concern to each of the
municipalities purported to be regulated by the enactment ...
[W]e hold that the people of the city are not 'subject to the will
of the legislature in the management of purely local municipal
business in which the state at large is not interested, and which is
not of any interest to any outside the local municipality.'38
[The reason for the immunity was] to make operative the con-
cept that the closer those who make and execute the laws are to
the citizens they represent the better are those citizens repre-
sented and governed in accordance with democratic ideals. That
objective would not be served if we should decide that the legis-
lative assembly preempts the field each time it makes a statute
applicable to all cities alike.39
Of course, the Heinig test was not self-applying. Some weighing of
state and local interests was required. The Heinig court held that the
test to be applied in determining whether a particular matter was one
of local or state concern is "not whether the state or the city has an
interest in the matter, for usually they both have, but whether the
state's interest or that of the city is paramount."4 The court said that
"[e]ach case requires a weighing of the state's interest against the in-
terest of the municipality."41 Finally, as to the appropriate instru-
mentality for making these critical decisions, the Heinig court was
clear: "Under the theory of home rule which we have adopted there
are involved two political agencies making conflicting claims to sov-
ereignty and the resolution of that conflict must be made by the
courts."42
The statute challenged in La Grande was a 1971 enactment requir-
37. 373 P.2d 680 (Or. 1962).
38. Id. at 683-84.
39. Id. at 685.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 688.




ing all city police and firemen to be brought within the state retire-
ment system within a two-year period unless the cities employing
them provided an equal or better system.43 In addition, the statute
required cities to pay premiums on life insurance policies for these
employees. The cities challenged the provision as having invaded
matters of local discretion protected by the state constitutional provi-
sions. The lower courts, relying on Heinig, agreed with the cities. In
granting review, the Oregon Supreme Court specifically asked the
parties to discuss the question of whether the Heinig test should be
refined or reconsidered and, if so, what criteria might apply to define
areas of state or local concern in the context of employee relations
and employee benefits." After receiving briefs from the parties and
several amicus briefs, the court by a narrow majority decided to cut
back substantially on the scope of local government immunity as
stated in the Heinig opinion. La Grande limits the local immunity to
certain "structural and organizational arrangements,"45 the majority
opinion disapproving of any reading of the Heinig opinion that ex-
tends beyond the proposition that a state law governing "the process
of city government" could not be imposed on an unwilling city.
The La Grande rationale essentially has more to do with the judi-
cial process than with the municipal process. In the majority opinion,
Justice Linde stated that any broader reading of the Heinig opinion
inevitably would require the courts to resolve issues of conflicting
substantive policies and that such a function is ultimately a political
and not a judicial task. Under a broad reading of Heinig, the court
must determine by a process of balancing whether a matter is one of
predominantly local or of state concern. Yet Justice Linde felt there
were no ascertainable standards to use in that process. The judicial
act therefore could be nothing other than a choice from among the
competing values. A truly judicial decision, by contrast, "must be
derived from a constitutional standard, not from the court's own view
of competing public policies."4 6 A court should not be placed in a
position of having to choose, for example, between the virtues of an
aesthetic environment and those of commerical profit,47 or between
the importance of the prevention of cavities and the strongly felt ob-
43. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 237.610-640, 243.005-055 (1977).
44 The court's request is set out at 576 P.2d at 1223.
45. 576 P.2d 1204, 1208.
46. Id. at 1210.
47. Id. at 1211, citing Oregon City v. Hartke, 400 P.2d 255 (Or. 1965).
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jections to fluoridation of the water supply.48 Moreover, urged Jus-
tice Linde, the entire doctrinal apparatus for dealing with state and
local conflict is unworkable. A court cannot in any principled way
divide the universe of municipal measures into those of state or local
concern, or identify which "fields" or "subjects" are in some sense
"occupied" or "preempted" or have some special state or local im-
port.
49
The constitution, however, provides for some area of local immu-
nity from state interference and Justice Linde's task was to identify
the scope of that immunity in terms that judges can use without de-
parting from the conventional judicial role. Justice Linde formulated
such a limitation: the constitutional immunity is conferred only for
matters having to do with processes, procedures or organizational
matters. Where a state law concerns "the structure and procedures of
local agencies," Justice Linde asserted that the statute would fall
before the conflicting local ordinance unless it was "justified by a
need to safeguard the interests of persons or entities affected by the
procedures of local government."5 On the other hand, if the state
enactment were "addressed primarily to substantive social, economic
or other regulatory objectives," it
prevails over contrary policies preferred by some local govern-
ments if it is clearly intended to do so, unless the law is shown to
be irreconcilable with the local community's freedom to choose
its own political form. In that case, such a state law must yield
in those particulars necessary to preserve that freedom of local
organization.
On that premise, Justice Linde then turned to the state laws in
question and found that they were substantive and, accordingly, not
within an area of municipal immunity.
The provisions for financial security for police officers and
firemen and their dependents in the event of retirement, disabil-
ity, or death address a social concern with the living standards of
these classes or workers, not with local governments as such;...
While the statewide retirement and insurance plans do displace
other plans that local agencies have made, or might make, for
these objectives, they are not irreconcilable with the freedom to
charter their own governmental structures that are reserved to
48. 576 P.2d at 1211, citing Baer v. City of Bend, 292 P.2d 134 (Or. 1956).
49. 576 P.2d at 1213.





the citizens . . by Article XI, section 2. Accordingly, the stat-
utes are constitutional.1
2
What generosity is left in the judicial response to questions of local
autonomy is only that implied by a presumption against conflict
which Justice Linde believes is appropriate. In comparing state and
local enactments to determine whether a conflict between them can
be said to exist, the Justice states that "it is reasonable to interpret
local enactments, if possible, to be intended to function consistently
with state laws, and equally reasonable to assume that the legislature
does not mean to displace local civil or administrative regulation of
local conditions by a state-wide law unless that intention is appar-
ent."53 Thus, in the companion case of Haley v. City of Troutdale,54
the same narrow majority of the court upheld a local building code
that was more stringent than the corresponding regulations promul-
gated by the state agency. Although the building code was presuma-
bly substantive and therefore not protected by any immunity, the
court expressed reluctance
to assume that the legislature meant to confine the protection of
Oregon residents exclusively to construction standards [as
promulgated by the state agency] and to place these beyond the
power of local communities to provide additional safeguards for
themselves. Certainly that intention is not unambiguously ex-
pressed. Until it is, we conclude that local requirements. . . are
not preempted by [state statute]. 55
It is ironic to find a self-denying statement of judicial modesty an-
nounced in a case where the resulting doctrine was unnecessary to the
decision, unsolicited by any of the litigants, and represented a far-
reaching break with the past.56 The irony was not lost on the dissent.
The vigorous opinions of Justices Tounge, Howell and Bryson argued
that the ultimate effect of the Linde principle would be to allow state
legislatures to make any decisions they desired, no matter how local
the impact, provided the subject is regarded as a matter of substance
rather than process or procedure. Not only was this a departure from
a long history of shared state/local governance, stated the dissent, but
also it was not required by any judicial inability to perform under the
old doctrine, or by any judicial incapacity to deal with issues having
52. Id,
53, Id. at 1211.
54 576 P.2d 1238 (Or. 1978).
55 Id. at 1242-43.
56 See Note, 1979 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 311, 324.
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political or social overtones. The kind of total legislative supremacy
produced by the majority opinion, argued Justice Bryson, was consis-
tent with the law prior to adoption of the home rule amendment.
Elimination of this total legislative power was the very purpose of the
home rule amendments. Moreover, to the extent the majority permits
some area of local immunity, the dissent found no principled justifi-
cation for drawing the immunity line on the basis of organization,
structure or procedure. Indeed, the dissent feared that the majority
principle might even permit the state to mandate expensive state pro-
grams that must be funded by municipal treasuries.
The majority opinion, while in many respects unusual in its
analytical clarity, 7 leaves much unanswered. Perhaps the central
question is why areas of process and procedure are alone entitled to
immunity. Is it likely that this is what the drafters of the home rule
amendments had in mind?58 Can a case be made that the courts have
plotted out such a line and the people have ratified it by inaction over
a long period of years? Can one suggest with assurance that the line
drawn will always correspond with the likelihood of extraterritorial
effects? In all cases the answer seems likely to be negative.
What is the policy basis for the conclusion that local choice should
extend only to procedural questions? Professor Sato would more
freely permit local immunity from state interference on matters of
structure or process because such matters are unlikely to have signifi-
cant extraterritorial effects. Of course, the Sato analysis would also
have extended the immunity to substative matters regulated in the
public sector only and thus might have produced a different result in
this case. But there is some feeling in both these approaches that
there is a stronger claim for local choice on matters that are procedu-
57. The court is one of the few to make unmistakably clear the dual function of
the home rule grant, for example. See 576 P.2d 1204, 1215 n.30 and the opinion on
rehearing at 586 P.2d 765, 767, 770-71 (1978).
58. Justice Linde relies on the fact that the constitutional language seems to limit
the state only with respect to municipal "charters," a form of language they would not
have used, he argues, had they intended the immunity to extend to ordinances on
substantive matters. See 586 P.2d 765, 767-68 (1978) (the opinion on rehearing).
Linde perceives that structural and procedural matters only deserve immunity from
state interference. Moreover, he finds in the history of the home rule amendments a
special concern of the drafters for structure and organization as the components of
local government most in need of protection from state interference. See 576 P.2d at
1207-10. However much one may applaud the clarity of this opinion, or even the
result, these seem relatively slender reeds upon which to erect the edifice Linde is




ral. 9 The National League of Cities model home rule provisions
seem to provide broader local immunity for matters of structural or-
ganization and procedure.6"
The real justification for confining the immunity to matters of
process may be that the doctrine describes a division that can be
made by courts with little intrusion into the substantive issue in-
volved. This would be consistent with Justice Linde's premise, al-
though the dissent made a forceful argument that the separation may
not be as easy to establish as Linde suggests. The difficulty that arises
in the application of such a test is illustrated by a recent Colorado
case.
In 1978, the Colorado Supreme Court was asked to resolve a diffi-
cult state/local conflict in Thornton v. Farmer's Reservoir & Irr'gation
Co.6 The dispute in Thornton was not over access to revenue
sources as in Weekes, or over control of public employment compen-
sation as in La Grande, but over the allocation among competing
claimants of Colorado's most scarce natural resource: water. In the
early 1970's, the City of Thornton felt that it needed additional water
resources to meet the present and future demands of its citizens. Af-
ter reviewing the existing opportunities for acquiring water by
purchase or lease, the city decided it should acquire the water rights
of the Standley Lake Division of the Farmers' Reservoir and Irriga-
tion Company. After an appraisal of the value of the water rights
and related property, the city extended a written offer of $9,300,000
for the property. After a series of meetings with the officials of the
Reservoir Company and meetings with the stockholders of the com-
pany, it became clear to the city that the majority of stockholders did
not wish to sell.
In March 1975, while these negotiations between the city and the
company were proceeding, the Colorado State Legislature enacted
the Water Rights Condemnation Act.62 That Act was an effort to
limit the reach of municipal condemnation proceedings with respect
to water rights. The Act provides for the appointment of three com-
59. Cf F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAS 368
(1970).
60. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR
MUNICIPAL HOME RULE § 6. The history of the model and its effects are reviewed in
Vanlandingham, Constitutional Municipal Home Rule Since the AMA (NLC) Model,
17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1975).
61 - Colo. -, 575 P.2d 382 (1978).
62. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-6-201 to 216 (1976 Supp.).
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missioners "to deterimine the issue of the necessity of exercising emi-
nent domain as proposed in the petition." The Act states that no
municipality shall be allowed to condemn water rights for any antici-
pated or future needs in excess of fifteen years. It further requires
that each city prepare a "Community Growth Development Plan"
and a detailed statement concerning the proposed condemnation of
water rights and the effect of the taking of those rights on community
growth. This plan was to be presented to the three commissioners
who would then determine the necessity of the condemnation.
The City of Thornton, unable to acquire the water rights by
purchase, began condemnation proceedings in November 1975. The
city did not comply with the procedures required by the 1975 Act in
filing and serving its condemnation petition, but rather followed an-
other statutorily authorized procedure. In a proceeding to determine
whether the district court had jurisdiction to hear Thornton's con-
demnation action, the district court ruled that the city's petition
should be dismissed for failure to comply with the 1975 Act.
Several legal issues could have been explored on appeal. First, the
power of the city to condemn water rights outside the city would have
to be established. Absent some constitutional or statutory grant of
power, the city simply would be unable to act; no issue of home rule
immunity would arise. Secondly, a determination would have to be
made as to whether the state statute was intended to apply to home
rule cities. The court would then have to determine whether some
immunity shielded the city from the operation of the state enactment.
It is in connection with this last question that the issues raised in the
Weekes concurrence and in the La Grande case would have to be
confronted.
The power of the City of Thornton to condemn water rights is
granted, first of all, by article XX, section 1 of the Colorado Constitu-
tion, which provides that home rule cities in the state
shall have the power, within or without its territorial limits, to
construct, condemn and purchase, . . . water works, . . . and
any other public utilities . . . required . . . for the use of said
city and county and the inhabitants thereof and any such sys-
tems, plants or works or ways. . . which said city. . . may de-
sire to purchase, in whole or in part, the same or any part thereof
may be purchased by said city . . . which may enforce such




by right of eminent domain.63
While this lanquage does not expressly confer power to condemn
water rights, the court concluded that it should be so interpreted. 64
In addition to this constitutional grant, there are several statutory
grants under which Colorado cities can exercise eminent domain
powers. The City of Thornton elected to proceed under, and had
fully complied with, section 38-1-101 of the Colorado Revised Stat-
ute,65 generally governing eminent domain proceedings. The 1975
Water Rights Act mandated a different set of procedures for cities
seeking to acquire water rights through the eminent domain process.
As indicated, this statute required a number of additional procedural
steps, including securing the permission of a special three-member
commission to determine the necessity for the condemnation. It also
imposed limits on the scope of a city's justification for the condemna-
tion by providing that cities could not condemn water rights for any
anticipated or future needs in excess of fifteen years.
Home rule immunity from state interference is provided by article
XX, section 6 of the Colorado Constitution which states that home
rule charters and ordinances pursuant thereto regarding "local and
municipal matters. . . shall supersede within the. . . jurisdiction of
[the city] any law of the state in conflict therewith."66
In addition to these constitutional and statutory provisions, the
charter of the City of Thornton expressly provided authority "to ac-
quire within or without its corporate limits . . . water, water rights
and water storage rights. . . and may take the same upon paying just
compensation to the owner as provided by law." 67
The Colorado Supreme Court did not follow the conventional
analysis outlined above for resolving state and local conflicts. Like
the majority in Weekes, the court in Thornton found a simpler means
for permitting the city to act. The court began by characterizing the
constitutional grant of eminent domain power as one in which the
people in the State of Colorado delegated to home rule cities "full
power to exercise eminent domain in the effectuation of any lawful,
63. COLO. CONSr. art. XX, § 1, made applicable to all home rule cities by art. XX,
§6
64. The court stated "We hold that the term 'water works' as used in the constitu-
tional provision includes water and water rights." - Colo. at -, 575 P.2d at 390.
65. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-101 (1973).
66 COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6.
67. THORNTON, COLO., CHARTER, § 16.7.
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public and municipal purpose, including particularly the acquisition
of water rights."68 The court next stated the conventional rule that
generally, the legislative powers of the home rule municipality
are superior with respect to local and municipal matters; and
that, in cases of conflict between the statute and the ordinance of
the home rule city related to a matter of statewide concern, the
statute must govern.69
On that premise, it would be arguable that the statute must prevail
here since the issue at hand-the relative merits of competing claims
on the state's water resources-is surely a matter of more than local
concern. The court, however, permitted the city to act, carving out an
exception to the general principle, said to apply when the city is act-
ing pursuant to a narrowly defined constitutional grant:
Here, however, there is involved a specific constitutional power
granted to home rule municipalities and, even though the matter
may be of statewide concern, the General Assembly has no
power to enact any law that denies the right specifically granted
by the Colorado constitution.7 °
How might the California and Oregon courts have treated this is-
sue? Would the balancing approach of Justice Richardson of the
California court have been preferable? That approach would have
required determining the relative weights of the state and the local
interest, and on that premise, there could be little doubt that the state
power would prevail. Not only are the extraterritorial impacts of lo-
cal choice obvious on these facts, but also the state statute setting up a
commission to consider a broad range of factors strongly suggests a
recognition of the extra-municipal effects.
The analysis of the California cases by Professor Sato does not
clearly point in one direction. On the one hand, it is possible to char-
acterize the Colorado statute as one governing matters of procedure,
hence presumptively within the area of local immunity under Sato's
third standard. Similarly, the grant of eminent domain power is
largely reserved to the public sector; hence, under Sato's second stan-
dard, this grant of power should be protected from state interference.
On the other hand, it is arguable that while the Colorado legislature
has prescribed a procedure in the Water Rights Condemnation Act, it
was one of those procedural matters Sato would have excepted from






his general analysis and left as a statewide concern: that is, a proce-
dure inseparable from an underlying state substantive policy, here,
the protection of non-municipal water users. Moreover, the extrater-
ritorial effects of eminent domain grants in this setting are obvious,
suggesting that under Sato's first standard the matter might be more
sensibly classified as of statewide concern.
The analysis of the Oregon court in La Grande is also difficult to
predict on these facts. Justice Linde would have asked if the power
in question involved the organization, procedure or structure of the
local government. If so, the power was at least presumptively beyond
the reach of state interference. How does one classify the power in
this case? The state appears to interfere in a procedural matter. That
is, the state statute mandates a special forum for the consideration of
municipal water right condemnations. Yet, the procedure here was
intended to have a distinctly substantive effect: either to make mu-
nicipal condemnation of extraterritorial water rights impossible or at
least to insure that considerations broader than those likely to be per-
ceived by the acting municipality be weighed in the decision. Is Jus-
tice Linde's analysis helpful with respect to "procedures" such as
these? Much the same question could be asked of Linde's analysis in
regard to other procedural arrangements with obvious and inten-
tional substantive implications, such as environmental protection
statutes or state land use planning codes.7 1
The Linde analysis allows room for state control of procedure
needed "to safeguard the interests of persons or entities affected by
the procedures of local government."72 Would this permit state ac-
tion in such areas as land use and environmental procedures? If so,
this further reduction in the scope of the local immunity may leave
little of real consequence for decision at the local level. When one
eliminates all matters of policy or substance, and also all structural or
procedural matters which may have external impacts or important
substantive effects, the area of protected local immunity is small.
While it may still contain matters of significance, there is little doubt
that its scope is much smaller than that which led to the original en-
thusiasm for home rule at the turn of the century73 or which has sur-
71. Cf National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-61 (West 1977);
ALl, MODEL LAND DEV. CODE.
72. - Colo. at -, 576 P.2d at 1215.
73. See generally H. McBAIN, THE LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL
HOME RULE (1916).
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faced more recently in the renewed interest in citizen participation
and neighborhood government.74
This is not, of course, to prove that the result of the Linde ap-
proach is undesirable. His concerns for the judicial process are im-
portant. Moreover, the concept of home rule may be ready for
substantial alteration. At least since Madison, commentators have
observed that there are special risks in placing important substantive
powers in relatively smaller and more homogenous governments, 75
and the concern is very much alive today.76 Moreover, students of
home rule have long recognized that the increasing interdependence
of local governments makes it more difficult to justify the sort of pa-
rochial decision making home rule may entail.77 What one does wish
for, however, is some concession in the Linde analysis that the idea of
home rule has indeed outlived some of its historic usefulness and in
today's setting may need significant limitation. Such a concession
may be difficult to make in a judicial opinion (especially an opinion
abjuring judicial policy-making). A more frank statement of the
matter, however, would at the least insure that the usual play of criti-
cal analysis would be brought to bear on the notion and that its fur-
ther refinement would continue.
Finally, how helpful is the approach actually taken by the Colo-
rado court in Thornton? One wonders whether it is particularly use-
ful to focus on the degree of specificity with which the local power
was granted. In the first place, it does not seem likely from the lan-
guage employed in the constitution that such a result could have been
intended. A Colorado home rule city operating under section 6 of
article XX has its immunity limited by the "local and municipal mat-
ters" language of that section. When it acts under a section I provi-
sion incorporated by reference in section 6, it is doubtful that the
drafters intended to free the city from the section 6 limiting language.
Moreover, such a result would be at variance with all other judicial
considerations of the matter.78 The court comes close to suggesting
74. See SCHMANDT, DECENTRALIZATION: A STRUCTURAL IMPERATIVE, IN
NEIGHBORHOOD CONTROL IN THE 1970's (Frederickson ed. 1973).
75. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
76. See, e.g., Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated- Warth P. Se/din and City of
Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373 (1978).
77. McGOLDRICK, LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE, 1916-1930
vii (1933).
78. More likely, the court is concerned that the state limitation imposed was ill-




that whenever the constitution confers a power on a home-rule mu-
nicipality with some degree of specificity, the state legislature lacks
the power to deal with the matter. Even courts that regard constitu-
tional home-rule grants as conferring immunities on cities always
read some limitation into the scope of the immunity granted. Finally,
on policy grounds the court's rationale does not seem sound. If a
Colorado home-rule city attempts to exercise its power to condemn
water rights in a manner plainly at odds with credible, statewide in-
terests, there can be little doubt that a court should intervene. The
analysis in Thornton, however, leaves the court with little in the way
of an acceptable premise for intervention. Presumably, the court
could only intervene by establishing that the constitutional grant be-
ing considered was not specific enough to require the Thornton result.
If that could not be done, the state interests would be frustrated. If
La Grande suggests the risks of abolishing the local immunity even
for matters which are purely local (because "substantive"), Thornton
suggests the opposite risks of extending the immunity to matters of
obvious state-wide concern.
III. CONCLUSION
When a court confronts a conflict between state and local compe-
tencies, the doctrinal lines for resolution need to be carefully tended
in aid of both predictability and intelligibility. In all the models so
far examined, the result seems to thrust a court into the position of
making some substantive assessment of the relative importance of the
interests at stake. The concurring opinion in Weekes expressly in-
vites such judicial balancing. In the La Grande analysis, although
Justice Linde attempted to minimize the policy-making role of the
courts, cases remain where the distinction between substance and
procedure is not clear, as in Thornton, or where this distinction does
not discriminate between those places where a local immunity should
or should not exist. In this latter situation, as the Justice recognized,
some account must be made of procedural matters having important
substantive consequences or having significant effects on those living
about the relative importance of municipal condemnations of water rights and state
efforts to protect agricultural interests. It is impossible to evaluate this choice without
knowing more, especially about the composition of the Colorado State legislature. In
any event, to the extent the opinion does rest on any such calculus, this would appear
to be precisely the sort of judicial activity for which Justice Linde believes courts are
not suited.
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outside the boundaries of the acting government. In either event, the
assessments will require judicial power. Similarly, a strict following
of Professor Sato's scheme necessitates a separation of public and pri-
vate sector allocations which, as Thornton shows, may be ineffective
in distinguishing those occasions when the immunity is justified from
those where it is not. Where, as in Thornton, the power in question is
conferred only on actors in the public sector but the exercise of the
power nevertheless has dramatic allocational effects on the private
sector, including effects of those living outside the acting government,
the analysis is not dispositive.
If, as is suggested, each of these doctrines requires some judicial
appraisal of the relative importance of the municipal and state pow-
ers asserted, that fact should not be masked by the proliferation of
more refined doctrinal distinctions (substance v. procedure, policy v.
process, etc.) even if the effect in some cases is to reduce somewhat
the judicial scrutiny required by past doctrine. Confronting the mat-
ter more frankly would seem preferable. Two possibilities may be
suggested. First, the respective competencies of state and local gov-
ernments may be expressly assigned, as is sometimes now done in
state constitutions and elsewhere. For example, the Colorado Consti-
tution, article XX, section 6, includes a detailed list of powers granted
local government. Although the exclusive nature of these powers is
present only for "municipal matters,"-a term needing judicial inter-
pretation-the enumeration of specific powers can reduce the judicial
role a substantial degree. A more elaborate example of the assigned
competencies approach is found in the Toronto metropolitan govern-
mental system in which the various governmental tasks are specifi-
cally allocated to the respective central and the local area
governments.79
Second, the courts might employ something of the presumptive ap-
proach used elsewhere in this and other fields when judgments must
turn on an inquiry which is critical yet beyond the technical or insti-
tutional competence of the courts. Indeed, the use of a presumptive
approach may better fit the American reluctance to specify govern-
mental relationships in great detail. In the local government law
field, one example of a role-altering presumption already exists: the
79. See J. BOLLENS & H. SCHANDT, THE METROPOLIS 282-88 (3rd ed. 1975);
Rose, A Decade of Metropolitan Government in Toronto, 13 BUFFALO L. REV. 539
(1964) (reviews the earlier history of the Toronto developments). See also H.





rule of interpretation known as the Dillon Rule.8" One consequence
of the rule is to limit the judicial role in determining local govern-
ment powers. In providing that local governments have no powers
not expressly granted, the rule precludes judicial creation of local
governmental powers not considered by the legislature. Without pro-
posing a return to the Dillon Rule, one might inquire how the respec-
tive judicial and legislative roles might be altered by a similar
presumption. What would be the likely effect of a presumption
favoring the state legislative enactment in any case of conflict? Sup-
pose, for example, that a court adopted the principle that whenever
the state enacted a measure clearly providing a different result from
that provided for under a local ordinance, the matter by definition
would be regarded as being of statewide concern and hence outside
the area of any local immunity. What would be the consequence of
such a rule?
First it is critical to note that there need be no reduction in the
degree of local governmental power to act in areas where the state
had not clearly acted in a contrary fashion. That is, the presumption
under consideration could reduce the municipal immuniy provided
by home rule without affecting the use of home rule as a grant of
power. Home rule cities could continue to operate without express
state delegations, could continue to innovate and experiment and
adapt to special local conditions. So long as the state had not acted in
a clearly applicable and clearly inconsistent way, the presumption
here being considered would not limit in any way the initiative power
of local governments.
Second, the presumption that the state usually wins in case of clear
conflict would mean that most decisions about the relative impor-
tance of local as against state preferences would be made in the state
legislature-a forum which at least potentially can consider a broader
range of factors and values than typically would be considered by the
acting municipality. Due to growing interdependence in our urban
regions, such broader perspective is of increasing importance and the
risks of parochial decisions are increasing. In Thornton, for example,
one cannot avoid the feeling that decisions concerning the relative
priorities for water as between the city and the agricultural interests
are not most fairly made within the Thornton City Council. And
despite all the statutory variations, Weekes leaves some lingering
doubt that a decision about the statewide consequences of municipal
80, See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
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income taxes may not best be made by the Oakland City Council.
Moreover, and Thornton is again an example, permitting wider state
control would permit the use of administrative mechanisms which
could with sensitivity, represent specially affected interests, develop
data, plan coordination and clarify issues. Remaining fears of state
interference with local government might adequately be reached by
existing constitutional limitations on the state legislature, such as
those familiar limits on special and local legislation or on state taxes
for local purposes."'
The third likely consequence of a presumption in favor of state
power in cases of state/local conflict would be a substantial reduction
of the troubled judicial role. When a distinguished student of the
question is forced to conclude that seventy-five years of litigation in
one state has produced only "confusion, uncertainty, and unpredict-
ability"82 it is time to accept the implication that the problem will not
succumb to formalistic distinctions and further doctrinal refinement.
Of course, such a presumption would not eliminate the judicial role
entirely. There remains the difficult, but judicially appropriate, task
of determining when the legislature intended to override local choice.
The preemption cases suggest that this area will remain challenging
and complex. 83
The presumption would leave to the state legislative branch the
accommodation of state and local conflict. That branch, while per-
haps not structurally suited to serve as a detailed delegator of munici-
pal powers-hence the use of home rule as a grant of power remains
justified-is probably better suited to accommodate state and local
interests in areas of conflict, subject to some limited constitutional
protections as noted above. To those who lack confidence in the
competence or fairness of state legislatures, it can be said that the
judicial record in this particular has not been unblemished, that diffi-
culties with legislatures are not necessarily good arguments for im-
posing unsuitable tasks on courts and that, in any event, we appear to
have precisely the quality of state legislatures we deserve.
81. For a general description and analysis of these techniques, see WINTERS,
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 14-31 (1961); F. MICHELMAN & T.
SANDALOW, supra note 5, at 334-39.
82. Sato, "Municpal,4ffairs'in Caiffornia, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1061 (1972).
83. See, e.g., Developments-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1625-59 (1976) (de-
velopments in state court attacks on exclusionary zoning).
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